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ON THE SECURITY OF SUBSPACE SUBCODES
OF REED–SOLOMON CODES FOR PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION
by
Alain Couvreur & Matthieu Lequesne
Abstract. — This article discusses the security of McEliece-like encryption schemes using subspace
subcodes of Reed–Solomon codes, i.e. subcodes of Reed–Solomon codes over Fqm whose entries lie
in a fixed collection of Fq–subspaces of Fqm . These codes appear to be a natural generalisation
of Goppa and alternant codes and provide a broader flexibility in designing code based encryption
schemes. For the security analysis, we introduce a new operation on codes called the twisted product
which yields a polynomial time distinguisher on such subspace subcodes as soon as the chosen Fq–
subspaces have dimension larger than m/2. From this distinguisher, we build an efficient attack
which in particular breaks some parameters of a recent proposal due to Khathuria, Rosenthal and
Weger.
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1. Introduction
In the late 70’s, at the very beginning of public key cryptography, McEliece proposed a public
key encryption scheme whose security relies on the hardness of the bounded decoding problem
[BMvT78]. However, the system should be instantiated with a public code equipped with an
efficient decoding algorithm and which should be computationally indistinguishable from an arbi-
trary code. In his seminal article [McE78], McEliece proposed to instantiate his system with a
binary Goppa code [Gop70, Gop71] (see [Ber73] for a description in English).
One of the major drawbacks of such a proposal is the significant size of the public key. McEliece’s
historical proposal with binary Goppa codes required a 32.7 kB key for a claimed classical security
of 65 bits. In the recent NIST submission Classic McEliece [BCL+19], a public key size of 261 kB
is proposed for a claimed security level of 128 bits. For this reason, there has been many attempts
in the last forty years to replace the Goppa codes used in McEliece’s scheme by other families
Key words and phrases. — Code-based cryptography, McEliece encryption scheme, subspace subcodes, GRS
codes, expansion of codes, square product of codes, key recovery attack.
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of codes, in order to reduce the key size. Many of these proposals focus on Generalised Reed-
Solomon (GRS) codes, since they benefit from excellent decoding properties. On the other hand,
their structure is difficult to hide. Consequently, to our knowledge, all code-based cryptographic
schemes using GRS codes or low-codimensional subcodes of GRS codes as trapdoor have been
attacked.
The use of GRS codes to replace Goppa codes in McEliece’s scheme was initially suggested in
Niederreiter’s paper [Nie86], but this proposal was attacked by Sidelnikov and Shestakov [SS92]
(although an earlier article from Roth and Seroussi [RS85] already explained how to recover the
structure of a GRS code). To overcome the attack of Sidelnikov and Shestakov while trying to
keep the benefits of GRS codes, several proposals appeared in the literature. Berger and Loidreau
proposed to replace the GRS code by a subcode of low codimension [BL05]; Wieschebrink [Wie06]
included some random columns in a generator matrix of a GRS code; his approach was enhanced
in NIST submission RLCE [Wan16, Wan17], where random columns are included and then
“mixed” with the original columns using specific linear transformations; finally Baldi, Bianchi,
Chiaraluce, Rosenthal and Schipani (BBCRS) [BBC+16] proposed to mask the structure of a
GRS code by right multiplying it by a “partially weight preserving” matrix. All these proposals
have been partially or fully broken using attacks derived from a square code distinguisher. The
first contribution, due to Wieschebrink [Wie10] broke Berger-Loidreau proposal, Wieschebrink’s
and BBCRS schemes were attacked in [CGG+14, COTG15] and RLCE in [CLT19].
In summary, forty years of research on the use of algebraic codes for public key encryption boil
down to the following observations.
(1) On one hand, the raw use of GRS codes as well as most of the variants using these codes lead
to insecure schemes.
(2) On the other hand, Goppa codes or more generally alternant codes remain robust decades
after they were initially proposed by McEliece.
Alternant codes are nothing but subfield subcodes of GRS codes. Hence, considering the spec-
trum with (full) GRS codes on one end and their subfield subcodes (i.e. alternant codes) on the
other, the intermediary case is that of subspace subcodes of Reed–Solomon codes. This notion of
subspace subcodes of Reed-Solomon (SSRS) was originally introduced without any cryptographic
motivation by Solomon, McEliece and Hattori [Ste93, MS94, Hat95, HMS98]. An SSRS code
is a subset of a parent Reed-Solomon code over Fqm consisting of the codewords whose components
all lie in a fixed λ-dimensional Fq-vector subspace of Fqm , for some λ 6 m. These codes are no
longer linear over Fqm but only over Fq. The SSRS construction provides long codes with good
parameters over alphabets of moderate size, in the spirit of alternant codes [MS86, Chapter 12].
Therefore these codes are interesting from an information-theoretic point of view.
For public key cryptography, two recent works exploring different approaches appeared in the
recent years. First, Berger, Gueye, Klamti and Ruatta [BGKR19] proposed a McEliece scheme
based on some low–dimensional subcodes of quasi–cyclic subspace subcodes of Reed–Solomon
codes. In another line of work, in the article “Encryption Scheme Based on Expanded Reed-
Solomon Codes” [KRW19a], Khathuria, Rosenthal andWeger propose an encryption scheme using
expanded subspace subcodes of GRS codes instead of Goppa codes. Throughout the document,
we will refer to this scheme as the XGRS scheme (where the X stands for expanded).
The use of subspace subcodes of Reed–Solomon codes is of particular interest in code based
cryptography since it includes McEliece’s original proposal based on Goppa codes on the one hand
and encryption based on generalised Reed–Solomon codes on the other hand as the two extremities
of a same spectrum. Indeed, starting from Reed–Solomon codes over Fqm and considering subspace
subcodes over subspaces of Fqm of dimension 1 6 λ 6 m, the case λ = m is corresponds to GRS
codes, while the case λ = 1 corresponds to alternant codes (which include Goppa codes). The
notion of subspace subcodes permits a modulation of the parameter λ. Consequently, they are of
particular interest for two reasons.
(1) Subspace subcodes may provide interesting codes for encryption with λ > 1, providing shorter
keys than the original McEliece scheme.
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(2) Their security analysis encompasses that of Goppa and alternant codes and may help to better
understand the security of McEliece encryption scheme. We emphasise that such a security
analysis is of crucial interest since Classic McEliece lies among the very few candidates selected
by the NIST for the last round of the post-quantum standardisation process.
λ
0 1 m
m/2
proved insecure
in this work
alternant codes, Goppa codes
(believed secure)
GRS codes
(known insecure)
Figure 1. The case λ = m (i.e.using the whole GRS code as secret key) is known to be
insecure. On the other hand, the case λ = 1 corresponding to alternant codes (among
which Goppa codes) is a well-studied hard problem. Our attack covers all cases where
m/2 < λ 6 m.
Our contribution. — In the present article, we first introduce a general public key cryptosystem
relying on subspace subcodes of Reed Solomon codes, which we refer to as the SSRS cryptosystem.
We prove that the XGRS cryptosystem of [KRW19a] is in fact a sub-instance of the SSRS
scheme. Then, we analyse the security of the SSRS cryptosystem, using alternatively a high-
level approach (considering abstract subspaces of Fqm) or a more constructive one (focusing on
explicit descriptions of such codes as Fq-linear codes using the expansion operator). We present
a distinguisher on the SSRS scheme, by introducing a new and original notion, which we called
twisted product of codes. Our distinguisher succeeds for any subpace subcode of a GRS code
over Fqm when the subspaces have dimension λ > m/2 (see Figure 1). Using this distinguisher
we derive a polynomial time attack on SSRS when λ > m/2, which in particular breaks some
parameters of the XGRS scheme proposed by its authors, namely the case of subspace subcodes
on 2–dimensional subspaces of GRS codes over Fq3 .
Related work. — This work should be related to [BGK19, § VI.B] where it is shown that an
encryption scheme based on an expanded GRS code (the full code, not a subspace subcode) is not
secure. Next, in the same reference [BGK19, § VI.C], the case of subspace subcodes is discussed
and the proposed attack involves a brute force search on the all the bases used for the expansion
of each position. This attack has an exponential complexity, while ours runs in polynomial time.
On the other hand, the “λ > m/2 condition” for the public code to be distinguished from
a random one should be compared to the results of [COT14b, COT17], where some classical
Goppa codes are attacked using, among others, the square code operation. The considered classical
Goppa codes correspond to the parameters m = 2 and λ = 1 and hence lie at the very limit of
the distinguisher. These Goppa codes got however broken due to peculiar features that give them
a larger dimension compared to generic alternant codes of the same parameters (see [SKHN76,
COT14a]).
Outline of the article. — We start in Section 2 by fixing the notation and bringing well–known
notions of algebraic coding theory that are necessary to follow the article. The notion of subspace
subcodes is recalled in Section 3 as well as some of their known properties. We also discuss the
way to practically represent subspace subcodes. Some operators play an important role in this
article, Section 4 is devoted to them and the way they interact with each other. In Section 5,
we present the SSRS cryptosystem and explain why the XGRS scheme is a proper sub-instance.
The notion of twisted square code and the corresponding distinguisher are introduced in Section 6.
Finally, Section 7 is devoted to the presentation of the attack on SSRS scheme.
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2. Notation and prerequisites
In this section, we fix the notation and recall some usual tools of code-based cryptography that
are used in the definition of subspace subcodes and in the construction the XGRS cryptosystem.
2.1. Notation. — In this article, q denotes a power of a prime and m a positive integer. The
vector space of polynomials of degree less than k over a field F is denoted by F[X ]<k. The space
of matrices with entries in a field F with m rows and n columns is denoted by Fm×n. Given an
F–vector space V and vectors v0, . . . ,vs−1 ∈ V , the subspace spanned over F by the vi’s is denoted
by
〈v0, . . . ,vs−1 〉F
def
=
{
s−1∑
i=0
λivi
∣∣∣∣λi ∈ F
}
.
Moreover, given a matrix G ∈ Fk×n, we denote by 〈G 〉
F
the space spanned by the rows of G,
that is to say the code with generator matrix G, defined as
〈G 〉
F
def
= 〈 v | v row of G 〉
F
= {m ·G | m ∈ Fk}.
The support of a vector is the set of its indices with non-zero entries. An [n, k] code over F is a
linear code over F of length n and dimension k.
Given two integers a, b with a < b, we denote by Ja, bK the interval of integers {a, a+ 1, . . . , b}.
The cardinality of a finite set U is denoted by |U |. Given a probabilistic event A, its probability
is denoted by P [A] and the mean of a random variable X is denoted by E [X ].
Convention. In this article, any word or finite sequence of length ℓ is indexed from 0 to ℓ − 1.
In particular, codewords of length n are indexed as follows: (x0, . . . , xn−1).
2.2. Reed–Solomon codes. —
Definition 1 (Generalised Reed–Solomon codes). — Let x ∈ Fnq be a vector whose entries
are pairwise distinct and y ∈ Fnq be a vector whose entries are all nonzero. The generalised
Reed–Solomon (GRS) code with support x and multiplier y of dimension k is defined as
GRSk(x,y)
def
= {(y0f(x0), . . . , yn−1f(xn−1)) | f ∈ Fq[x]<k} .
If y = (1, . . . , 1) then the code is said to be a Reed–Solomon code and denoted as RSk(x).
2.3. Component-wise product of codes and square codes distinguisher. —
Notation 2. — The component-wise product of two vectors a and b in Fn is denoted by
a ⋆ b
def
= (a0b0, . . . , an−1bn−1).
This definition extends to the product of codes, where the component-wise product or ⋆–product
of two K-linear codes A and B ⊆ Fn spanned over a field K ⊆ F is defined as
A ⋆K B
def
= 〈a ⋆ b | a ∈ A , b ∈ B 〉
K
.
When A = B, we denote by A ⋆2
K
def
= A ⋆K A the square code of A spanned over K.
Remark 3. — The field K in Notation 2 is almost always equal to F the base field on which the
codes are defined. However, it may sometimes be a subfield. For the sake of clarity, we make the
value of K explicit only in the ambiguous cases. The rest of the time we simply write A ⋆2 the
square product of a code.
We recall the following result on the generic behaviour of random codes with respect to this
operation.
Theorem 4. — ([CCMZ15, Theorem 2.3], informal) For a linear code R chosen at random
over Fq of dimension k and length n, the dimension of R
⋆2 is typically min(n,
(
k+1
2
)
).
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Theorem 4 provides a distinguisher between random codes and algebraically structured
codes such as generalised Reed–Solomon codes and their low–codimensional subcodes [Wie10,
CGG+14], Reed–Muller codes [CB14], polar codes [BCD+16] some Goppa codes [COT14b,
COT17], high–rate alternant codes [FGO+11] or algebraic geometry codes [CMCP14,
CMCP17]. For instance, in the case of GRS codes, we have the following result.
Proposition 5. — Let n, k,x,y be as in Definition 1. Then,
(GRSk(x,y))
⋆2
= GRS2k−1(x,y ⋆ y).
In particular, if k 6 n/2, then
dim (GRSk(x,y))
⋆2
= 2k − 1.
Thus, compared to random codes whose square have dimension quadratic in the dimension of
the code, the square of a GRS code has a dimension which is linear in that of the original code.
This criterion allows to distinguish GRS codes of appropriate dimension from random codes. A
rich literature of cryptanalysis of code–based encryption primitives involves this operation.
Remark 6. — In an initial version of the XGRS cryptosystem, submitted on ArXiv [KRW19b],
such a distinguisher could be applied to the cryptosystem and lead to an attack. The authors
changed the cryptosystem in order to avoid such attacks.
2.4. Punctured and shortened codes. — The notions of puncturing and shortening are clas-
sical ways to build new codes from existing ones. These constructions will be useful for the attack.
We recall here their definition. For a codeword c ∈ Fnq , we denote by (c0, . . . , cn−1) its entries.
Definition 7 (Punctured code). — Let C ⊆ Fnq and L ⊆ J0, n− 1K. The puncturing of C at
L is defined as the code
PctL (C )
def
= {(ci)i∈J0,n−1K\L s.t. c ∈ C }.
Similarly, given a matrixM with n columns, one defines PctL (M) as the matrix whose columns
with index in L are removed, so that puncturing a generator matrix of a code yields a generator
matrix of the punctured code.
Definition 8 (Shortened code). — Let C ⊆ Fnq and L ⊆ J0, n − 1K. The shortening of C at
L is defined as the code
ShL (C )
def
= PctL ({c ∈ C s.t. ∀i ∈ L, ci = 0}) .
Shortening a code is equivalent to puncturing the dual code, as explained by the following
proposition.
Proposition 9 ([HP03, Theorem 1.5.7]). — Let C be a linear code over Fnq and L ⊆ J0, n− 1K.
Then,
ShL (Dual(C )) = Dual(PctL (C )) and Dual(ShL (C )) = PctL (Dual(C )) ,
where Dual(A ) denotes the dual of the code A .
Remark 10. — The notation Dual(C ) to denote the dual code of C is rather unusual. This
code is commonly denoted C⊥, but it will be more convenient to write it the former way and see
duality as an operator on codes.
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2.5. Bases and trace map. — In this paper we will consider codes over a finite field Fqm and
codes over its subfield Fq. A useful and natural tool is the trace map.
Definition 11 (Trace map). — Let q be a prime power and m an integer. The trace map is
defined as
Tr :
{
Fqm −→ Fq
x 7−→
∑m−1
i=0 x
qi .
Definition 12 ([LN97, Definition 2.30]). — Let B = (b0, . . . , bm−1) be an Fq-basis of Fqm .
There exists a unique basis B∗ = (b∗0, . . . , b
∗
m−1), such that :
∀0 6 i, j 6 m− 1, Tr(bib
∗
j) =
{
1 if i = j,
0 otherwise.
This basis will be referred to as the dual basis of B and denoted B∗.
Given an Fq–basis B = (b0, . . . , bm−1) of Fqm and x an element of Fqm . Then the expression of
x as an Fq–linear combination of the elements of B writes as
(1) x = Tr(b∗0x)b0 + · · ·+Tr(b
∗
n−1x)bn−1
where B∗ = (b∗0, . . . , b
∗
m−1) denotes the dual basis of B.
3. Subspace Subcodes
3.1. Definition and first properties. —
Definition 13 ([HMS98]). — Given a linear code C defined over a field Fqm , and a λ-
dimensional subspace S of Fqm (0 6 λ 6 m), the subspace subcode C|S is defined to be the set of
codewords of C whose components all lie in S.
C|S
def
= {c ∈ C | ∀i ∈ J0, n− 1K, ci ∈ S} ⊆ F
n
qm .
It is important to note that the code C|S is an Fq–linear subspace of F
n
qm which is generally
neither Fqm–linear nor linear over some intermediary extension. Since each entry of a codeword
can be represented as λ elements of Fq, the code could be converted into a code over the alphabet
F
λ
q . Such a code would form an additive subgroup over (F
λ
q )
n
, therefore this construction is called
a subgroup subcode by Jensen in [Jen95]. In a context of message transmission, this natural way
to represent such a subspace subcode is detailed further in § 3.2.
We can generalise this definition with different subspaces for each entry.
Definition 14. — Given a linear code C of length n over a field Fqm , and the λ-dimensional
subspaces (S0, . . . ,Sn−1) of Fqm (0 6 λ 6 m), the subspace subcode C|(S0,...,Sn−1) is defined to be
the set of codewords of C such that the i-th components lies in Si.
C|(S0,...,Sn−1)
def
= {c ∈ C | ∀i ∈ J0, n− 1K, ci ∈ Si}.
Remark 15. — When S0 = · · · = Sn−1 = Fq, then we find the usual definition of subfield
subcode.
Remark 16. — It is possible to give a more general definition where the Si’s do not have the
same dimension λ. However, such a broader definition would be useless in the present article.
Proposition 17. — Let C be a linear code of length n and dimension k over Fqm and S ⊆ Fqm
be a subspace of dimension λ 6 m. Then
(2) dimFq C|S > km− n(m− λ).
Proof. — See for instance [Jen95, Theorem 2 (1)].
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Example 18. — The following example comes from [HMS98].
Consider C the Reed–Solomon code over F24 of length 15 and dimension 9. This code has
minimum distance 7. Any element of F24 can be decomposed over the F2-basis (1, α, α
2, α3),
where α is a root of the irreducible polynomial X4 +X + 1. Let S be the subspace spanned by
(1, α, α2). The code C|S is the subset of codewords of C that have no component in α
3. Hence,
if one uses this code for communication, there is no need to send the α3 component, since it is
always zero.
So this subspace subcode can be seen as an F2-linear code of length 15 over the set of binary
3-tuples. But the code is not a linear code over F23 . The minimum distance of C|S is at least 7,
because it cannot be less than the minimum distance of the parent code. The number of codewords
in C|S is 2
22. As a comparison, one other way to create a code of length 15 over binary 3-tuples
is by shortening the generalised BCH code [63, 52, 7] over F23 . This gives a [15, 4,> 7] code over
F23 which has 2
12 codewords.
Similarly to the case of subfield subcodes, inequality (2) is typically an equality as explained in
the following statement that we prove because of a lack of references.
Proposition 19. — Let R be a uniformly random code among the codes of length n and di-
mension k over Fqm . Let S0, . . . ,Sn−1 be Fq–subspaces of Fqm of dimension λ. Suppose that
km > n(m− λ). Then, for any positive integer ℓ such that ℓ 6 km− n(m− λ), we have
P
[
dimFq R|(S0,...,Sn−1) > km− n(m− λ) + ℓ
]
6 q−ℓ
(
1
1− q−mn
+
1
qkm−n(m−λ)
)
.
In particular, for fixed values of q,m and λ, this probability is in O(q−ℓ) when n→∞.
Proof. — Let Grand be a uniformly random variable among the full rank matrices in F
k×n
qm and
R
def
= {mGrand | m ∈ F
k
qm}.
The code R is uniformly random among the set of [n, k] codes over Fqm ([Cou20, Lemma 3.12]).
Let Φ be the Fq–linear canonical projection
Φ : Fnqm −→
n−1∏
i=0
Fqm/Si.
Then, R|(S0,...,Sn−1) is the kernel of the restriction of Φ to R and hence,
E
[
|R|(S0,...,Sn−1)|
]
= E

 ∑
m∈Fk
qm
1Φ(mGrand)=0


=
∑
m∈Fk
qm
P [Φ(mGrand) = 0]
= 1 +
∑
m∈Fk
qm
\{0}
P [Φ(mGrand) = 0] .(3)
Since Grand is uniformly random among the full–rank matrices, then for any m ∈ F
k
qm \ {0}, the
vector mGrand is uniformly random in Fqm \ {0} ([Cou20, Lemma 3.13]) and hence
∀m ∈ Fkqm \ {0}, P [Φ(mGrand = 0)] =
|kerΦ \ {0}|∣∣Fnqm \ {0}∣∣
=
|
∏
i Si| − 1
qmn − 1
=
qλn − 1
qmn − 1
6 q−n(m−λ) ·
1
1− q−mn
·
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Thus, applied to (3),
E
[
|R|(S0,...,Sn−1)|
]
6 1 + |Fkqm \ {0}| · q
−n(m−λ) ·
1
1− q−mn
6 1 + qkm−n(m−λ) ·
1
1− q−mn
·
Finally, using Markov inequality, we get
P
[
dimFq (R|(S0,...,Sn−1)) > km− n(m− λ) + ℓ
]
= P
[
|R|(S0,...,Sn−1)| > q
km−n(m−λ)+ℓ
]
6
E
[
|R|(S0,...,Sn−1)|
]
qkm−n(m−λ)+ℓ
6 q−ℓ
(
1
1− q−mn
+
1
qkm−n(m−λ)
)
.
3.2. How to represent subspace subcodes? — For a practical implementation, subspace
subcodes may be represented as codes over the subfield Fq with a higher length. For this sake we
introduce the expansion operator and give some of its properties.
3.2.1. The Expansion Operator. —
Definition 20 (Expansion of a vector). — For a basis B of Fqm , let ExpVecB denote the
expansion of a vector over the basis B defined by
{
F
ℓ
qm −→ F
mℓ
q
(x0, . . . , xℓ−1) 7−→ (Tr(b∗0x0), . . . ,Tr(b
∗
m−1x0), . . . ,Tr(b
∗
0xℓ−1) . . . ,Tr(b
∗
m−1xℓ−1)),
where B∗ = (b∗0, . . . , b
∗
m−1) denotes the dual basis of B. Note that we will apply this operator to
vectors of different lengths ℓ.
As seen in (1), regarding an element x ∈ Fqm as the vector (x) of length 1, let (x0, . . . , xm−1)
def
=
ExpVecB((x)) ∈ F
m
q , then x =
∑m−1
i=0 xibi.
Definition 21 (Expansion of a code). — For a linear code C of length n over Fqm and a
basis B of Fqm , denote ExpCodeB(C ) the linear code over Fq defined by
ExpCodeB(C )
def
= {ExpVecB(c) | c ∈ C }.
We can also define the expansion operator over matrices.
Definition 22 (Expansion of a matrix). — Given B = (b0, . . . , bm−1) an Fq-basis of Fqm .
Let ExpMatB denote the following operation.


F
k×n
qm −→ F
mk×mn
q

m0,0 m0,1 · · · m0,n−1
m1,0 m1,1 · · · m1,n−1
...
...
...
mk−1,0 mk−1,1 · · · mk−1,n−1

 7−→


M0,0 M0,1 · · · M 0,n−1
M1,0 M1,1 · · · M 1,n−1
...
...
...
Mk−1,0 Mk−1,1 · · · Mk−1,n−1


where
M i,j
def
=


Tr(b0b
∗
0mi,j) Tr(b0b
∗
1mi,j) . . . Tr(b0b
∗
m−1mi,j)
Tr(b1b
∗
0mi,j) Tr(b1b
∗
1mi,j) . . . Tr(b1b
∗
m−1mi,j)
...
...
...
Tr(bm−1b
∗
0mi,j) Tr(bm−1b
∗
1mi,j) . . . Tr(bm−1b
∗
m−1mi,j)

 ∈ Fm×mq ,
and B∗ = (b∗0, . . . , b
∗
m−1) denotes the dual basis of B (Definition 12).
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Remark 23. — Caution, applying ExpMatB to an 1×n matrix returns an m× n matrix. It is
not equivalent to applying ExpVecB to the vector corresponding to this row.
Remark 24. — ExpMatB∗(M ) = (ExpMatB(M
⊺))
⊺
.
Proposition 25 ([KRW19a, Proposition 1]). — Let C be a linear code of dimension k and
length n over Fqm . Let G denote a generator matrix of C and H denote a parity-check matrix of
C . Then, for any fixed Fq-basis B of Fqm , the following hold.
(i) For all x ∈ Fkqm , we have ExpVecB(x · G) = ExpVecB(x) · ExpMatB(G).
(ii) For all y ∈ Fnqm , we have ExpVecB((H · y
⊺)
⊺
)
⊺
= ExpMatB∗(H) · ExpVecB(y)
⊺
.
Corollary 26. — Let G and H be a generator and a parity-check matrix of C respectively. Let B
denote an Fq-basis of Fqm . Then ExpMatB(G) and ExpMatB∗(H) are respectively a generator
matrix and a parity-check matrix of ExpCodeB(C ).
Definition 27 (Block). — Given a vector v ∈ Fnqm , an Fq–basis B of Fqm and a non negative
integer i < n, the i–th block of the expanded vector ExpVecB(v) ∈ F
mn
q is the length m vector
composed by the entries of index mi,mi + 1, . . . ,mi +m − 1 of ExpVecB(v). It corresponds to
the decomposition over B of the i-th entry of v. We extend this definition to matrices, where the
i-th block of an expanded matrix means the mk ×m matrix whose rows correspond to the i-th
block of each row of the expanded matrix.
In particular, the expansion in a basis B of some x ∈ Fnqm is the concatenation of n blocks of
length m.
3.2.2. Expansion over various bases. — We have seen in Definition 14 that we could define a
subspace subcode with different subspaces for each entry. Similarly, we can define an expansion
with regard to a different basis for each entry.
Definition 28. — Given ℓ bases (B0, . . . ,Bℓ−1) of Fqm , let ExpVec(Bi)i denote the expansion
of a vector of length ℓ, such that the ith column is expanded over the basis Bi:
ExpVec(Bi)i(x0, . . . , xℓ−1) =
(Tr(b∗0,0x0), . . . ,Tr(b
∗
0,m−1x0), . . . ,Tr(b
∗
ℓ−1,0xℓ−1) . . . ,Tr(b
∗
ℓ−1,m−1xℓ−1)),
where Bi = (bi,0, . . . , bi,m−1).
Definition 29. — For a linear code C of length n over Fqm and n bases (Bi)i of Fqm , denote
ExpCode(Bi)i(C ) the linear code over Fq defined by:
ExpCode(Bi)i(C )
def
= {ExpVec(Bi)i(c) | c ∈ C }.
Definition 30. — Given n + 1 bases (B0, . . . ,Bn−1, B¯) of Fqm , let ExpMat
B¯
(Bj)j denote the
expansion of a matrix


F
k×n
qm −→ F
mk×mn
q

m0,0 m0,1 · · · m0,n−1
m1,0 m1,1 · · · m1,n−1
...
...
...
mk−1,0 mk−1,1 · · · mk−1,n−1

 7−→


M0,0 M0,1 · · · M 0,n−1
M1,0 M1,1 · · · M 1,n−1
...
...
...
Mk−1,0 Mk−1,1 · · · Mk−1,n−1


where
M i,j
def
=


Tr(b¯0b
∗
j,0mi,j) Tr(b¯0b
∗
j,1mi,j) . . . Tr(b¯0b
∗
j,m−1mi,j)
Tr(b¯1b
∗
j,0mi,j) Tr(b¯1b
∗
j,1mi,j) . . . Tr(b¯1b
∗
j,m−1mi,j)
...
...
...
Tr(b¯m−1b
∗
j,0mi,j) Tr(b¯m−1b
∗
j,1mi,j) . . . Tr(b¯m−1b
∗
j,m−1mi,j)

 ∈ Fm×mq .
With this definition, the properties of Proposition 25 still hold for various bases.
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Remark 31. — Note that contrary to the expansion of codes, the expansion of a matrix depends
on the choice of a basis B¯ for the vertical expansion. When considering the code spanned by an
expansion matrix, different choices of B¯ yield the same code, so we will omit the vertical expansion
base in the expansion matrix operator.
3.2.3. Squeezing: the inverse of expansion. — We can define the “inverse” of the expansion op-
erator.
Definition 32 (Squeezing Operator). — Let B = (b0, . . . , bm−1) be a basis of Fqm . Let
x = (x0,0, . . . , x0,m−1, . . . , xn−1,0, . . . , xn−1,m−1) ∈ Fmnq . We define the squeezed vector of x with
respect to the basis B as
SqueezeVecB(x)
def
=
(m−1∑
j=0
x0,jbj, . . . ,
m−1∑
j=0
xn−1,jbj
)
∈ Fnqm .
Let C be an [m× n, k]–code over Fq. We define the squeezed code of C with respect to the basis
B as
SqueezeCodeB(C )
def
= {SqueezeVecB(c) | c ∈ C } .
Proposition 33. — Let C be an [n, k] code over Fqm . Let B = (b0, . . . , bm−1) be a basis of Fqm .
Then the following equality holds.
SqueezeCodeB(ExpCodeB(C )) = C .
Finally we can define squeezing over a matrix.
Definition 34 (Squeezing matrices). — Let B = (b0, . . . , bm−1) be a basis of Fqm . Let
M ∈ Fmk×mnq denote an mk × mn matrix. Then SqueezeMatB(M ) ∈ F
mk×n
q denotes the
matrix whose rows are obtained by squeezing each row of the matrix M over B.
Remark 35. — Note that this matrix does not necessarily have full rank. In particular, if M
is obtained by expanding a matrix of rank r over the basis B, then SqueezeMatB(M ) will be of
rank r. It is also worth noting that for a matrix M ∈ Fk×nqm , then SqueezeMatB(ExpMatB(M))
is a km× n matrix and hence is not equal to M but generates the same code.
Remark 36. — Similarly to the expansion operators, we can define the squeezing operators with
a different basis for each block.
3.2.4. Representation of subspace subcodes as shortenings of expanded codes. — Let C be a code
of length n and dimension k over the field Fqm and S denote an Fq-subspace of Fqm of dimension
λ 6 m. Let BS = (b0, . . . , bλ−1) ∈ Fλqm be an Fq-basis of S. Then any vector c = (c0, . . . , cn−1) ∈
Sn, i.e.whose entries are all in S can be expanded as
ExpVecBS (c)
def
= (c0,0, . . . , c0,λ−1, . . . , cn−1,0, . . . , cn−1,λ−1),
where the ci,j
′s are the coefficients of the decomposition of ci in the BS .
Remark 37. — Note that the previous definition makes sense only for vectors in Sn.
Next, the subspace subcode C|S can be represented as
ExpCodeBS (C|S)
def
= {ExpVecBS (c) | c ∈ C|S}.
Here again, as noticed in Remark 37, the notion is well–defined only for codes with entries in S.
Similarly to Definition 27, a block refers to a set of the form Jiλ, (i + 1)λ − 1K. That is to say,
a set of λ = dimS consecutive indexes of the expanded code, corresponding to the decomposition
of a single entry in S in the basis BS .
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3.2.5. Practical calculation of the expansion of a subspace subcode. — The practical calculation
rests first on the following statement.
Lemma 38. — For integers n and λ < m, denote J (λ,m) the subset of J0,mn− 1K consisting
of the last m− λ entries of each block of length m
(4) J (λ,m)
def
= {im+ j, i ∈ J0, n− 1K, j ∈ Jλ,m− 1K} .
Then,
ExpCodeBS (C|S) = ShJ (λ,m) (ExpCodeB(C )) .
Let H ∈ Fk×nqm denote a parity–check matrix of C . Complete the basis BS = (b0, . . . , bλ−1)
with m − λ additional elements (bλ, . . . , bm−1) ∈ F
m−λ
qm such that B = (b0, . . . , bm−1) forms an
Fq–basis of Fqm . According to Corollary 26, the matrix ExpMatB∗(H) is a parity–check matrix
of ExpCodeB(C ) and, from Proposition 9, removing (puncturing) the last m−λ columns of each
block of this matrix provides a parity–check matrix of ExpCodeBS (C|S).
Remark 39. — Of course, what precedes extends straightforwardly to various subspaces and
bases.
3.3. Subspace subcodes of generalised Reed–Solomon codes. — Expanding codes, in
particular Reed–Solomon codes, over the base field has been studied since the 1980’s. For instance,
in [KL85, KL88], Kasami and Lin investigate the weight distribution of expanded binary Reed–
Solomon codes. Sakakibara, Tokiwa and Kasahara extend their work to q-ary Reed–Solomon codes
[STK89].
But the idea behind subspace subcodes, which consists in keeping only the subset of codewords
that are defined over a subspace of the field, first appears in a paper by Solomon [Sol93]. In
a joint work with McEliece [MS94], they define the notion of trace-shortened codes, which is a
special case of subspace subcodes where λ = m − 1 and where the considered subspace S is the
kernel of the trace map. These articles focus uniquely on Reed–Solomon codes. Still, this point
of view turns out to be the most general one since a subspace subcode of a GRS code can always
be regarded as a subspace subcode of an RS code by changing the subspaces as explained by the
following statements.
Proposition 40. — Let C ⊆ Fnqm , S0, . . . ,Sn−1 ⊆ Fqm be Fq subspaces and let a ∈ (F
×
qm)
n
.
Then,
(C ⋆ a)|(S0,...,Sn−1) = C|(a−10 S0,...,a
−1
n−1Sn−1)
⋆ a.
Corollary 41. — Let x,y ∈ Fnqm be a support and a multiplier and S0, . . . ,Sn−1 ⊆ Fqm , then
GRSk(x,y)|(S0,...,Sn−1) = RSk(x)|(y−10 S0,...,y
−1
n−1Sn−1)
⋆ y.
The notion is then generalised to any kind of subspace and any code by Jensen in [Jen95]
under the name subgroup subcodes. In his thesis [Hat95] and in [HMS98], Hattori studies the
dimension of subspace subcodes of Reed–Solomon codes. Some conjectures of Hattori are later
proved by Spence in [Spe04]. Cui and Pei extend the results to generalised Reed–Solomon codes
in [JJ01]. Then, Wu proposes a more constructive approach of these codes using the equivalent
of the expansion operator in [Wu11].
The idea of using a various basis arises in [vDT99]. The first use of this notion for cryptography
comes from Gabidulin and Loidreau who propose to use subspace subcodes of Gabidulin codes
for a rank-metric based cryptosystem in [GL05, GL08]. Then Khathuria, Rosenthal and Weger
proposed their code-based cryptosystem in [KRW19a], which is the first proposal to use subspace
subcodes for cryptography in Hamming metric. At the same time, Berger, Gueye, Klamti and
Ruatta propose another cryptosystem based on subspace subcodes of binary Reed–Solomon codes
in [BGK19, BGKR19].
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4. Further properties of the expansion operator
We now introduce some properties of the expansion operators. More specifically, in order to
analyse the XGRS cryptosystem, we study how this operator behaves with respect to other oper-
ations (especially those used in the key generation): puncturing/shortening, computing the dual,
changing the expansion basis. We also consider the relation with the square product operation,
as this is a natural distinguisher for GRS-based codes.
In this section, for the sake of clarity, all properties will be defined considering the same basis for
each entry, but everything works exactly the same way if one considered expansion with a different
basis for each entry, as different columns of Fqm (or blocks of columns of Fq corresponding to the
expansion of same column of Fqm) do not interact.
4.1. Puncturing and shortening. —
Lemma 42. — Let C be an [n, k] code over Fqm . Let L denote a subset of J0, n− 1K. Then the
following equalities hold.
ExpCodeB(PctL (C )) = PctL′ (ExpCodeB(C )) ,
ExpCodeB(ShL (C )) = ShL′ (ExpCodeB(C )) ,
where L′ denotes the set of all columns generated from expanding columns in L′, that is
L′
def
=
⋃
i∈L
{i+ j, 0 6 j < m}.
Proof. — The result is straightforward for puncturing. The expansion operation is independent
for each column, hence puncturing a column before expanding is equivalent to puncturing the
corresponding block of m columns. As for shortening, the shortening operation is the dual of
puncturing operation, hence the result is a consequence of the next lemma.
4.2. Dual code. —
Lemma 43 ([Wu11], Lemma 1). — Let B be a basis and B∗ denote the dual basis. For all
a, b ∈ Fnqm , if a and b are orthogonal, i.e. a · b
⊺ = 0, then ExpVecB(a) and ExpVecB∗(b) are
orthogonal
ExpVecB(a) · (ExpVecB∗(b))
⊺ = 0.
Corollary 44. — Let C be an [n, k] code over Fqm . Let B = (b0, . . . , bm−1) be a basis of Fqm .
Then the following equality holds.
Dual(ExpCodeB(C )) = ExpCodeB∗(Dual(C )),
where B∗ denotes the dual basis of B.
4.3. Changing the expansion basis. —
Lemma 45. — Let C be an [n, k] code over Fqm . Let B = (b0, . . . , bm−1) be an Fq–basis of Fqm .
Let Q ∈ Fm×mq denote an invertible m×m matrix. The following equality holds.
ExpCodeB·(Q−1)⊺(C ) = ExpCodeB(C ) ·


Q
. . .
Q

 .
Proof. — Let c be a codeword of C . We only focus on the first entry of c. Denote x ∈ Fqm
this entry and (x0, . . . , xm−1) = ExpVecB((x)) ∈ F
m
q . By definition, x =
∑m−1
i=0 xibi. Let
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D = (d0, . . . , dm−1) be the basis B ·
(
Q−1
)⊺
. For all i ∈ J0,m−1K, we have bi =
∑m
j=0 djqi,j where
Q = (qi,j)06i,j<m. Replacing the bi’s by this formula, we obtain
x =
∑
i
xi
(∑
j
djqi,j
)
=
∑
j
(∑
i
xiqi,j
)
dj .
Therefore,
ExpVecB(x) ·Q = ExpVecD(x).
This holds for any entry of any codeword c ∈ C .
Lemma 46. — Let C be an [n, k] code over Fqm . Let (Bi)i be n bases of Fqm . Let (Qi) ∈ (F
m×m
q )
n
denote n invertible m×m matrices. The following equality holds.
ExpCode(Bi·(Q−1i )
⊺
)i
(C ) = ExpCodeBi(C ) ·


Q0
. . .
Qn

 .
4.4. Scalar multiplication in Fqm . —
Lemma 47. — Let C be an [n, k] code over Fqm . Let (Bi)i be n basis of Fqm . Let a =
(a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ Fnqm denote a vector of length n over Fqm . The following equality holds.
ExpCode(Bi)i(C ) = ExpCode(aiBi)i({(c ⋆ a) | c ∈ C })
= ExpCode(aiBi)i(C ⋆ a).
5. The cryptosystem
Let us first present a generic encryption scheme based on subspace subcodes of GRS codes.
This cryptosystem will be referred to as the Subspace Subcode of Reed–Solomon (SSRS) scheme.
Then, we present the XGRS scheme [KRW19a] and explain why it is a sub–instance of the SSRS
scheme.
5.1. SSRS: a generic scheme based on subspace subcodes of GRS codes. —
5.1.1. Parameters. — The cryptosystem is publicly parametrised by:
– q a prime power;
– m an integer;
– λ such that 0 < λ < m;
– n, k such that 0 6 k < n 6 qm and km > (m− λ)n.
5.2. Key generation. —
– Generate a uniformly random vector x ∈ Fnqm with distinct entries.
– Choose n uniformly random λ–dimensional vector subspaces S0, . . . ,Sn−1 ⊆ Fqm with re-
spective bases BS0 , . . . ,BSn−1.
– Let Gpub ∈ F
(km−n(m−λ))×λn
q denote a generator matrix of the code
Cpub
def
= ExpCode(BS0 ,...,BSn−1)
(
RSk(x)|(S0,...,Sn−1)
)
.
If Gpub is not full-rank, abort and restart the process. See Section 3.2.5 for the practical
computation on Gpub.
– The public key is Gpub and the secret key is (x,BS0, . . . ,BSn−1).
Lemma 48 (Public Key Size). — The public key is a matrix of size m(n− k)× λn over Fq.
Only the systematic part is transmitted. Hence the public key size in bits is
m(n− k)(λn−m(n− k)) log2(q).
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5.2.1. Encryption. — Let m ∈ F
mk−(m−λ)n
q be the plaintext. Denote
t
def
= ⌊
n− k
2
⌋.
Choose e ⊆ F
(m−λ)n
q uniformly at random among vectors of F
(m−λ)n
q with exactly t non-zero
blocks (see Definition 27).
5.2.2. Decryption. — From y ∈ Fλnq , construct a vector y
′ ∈ Fmnq by completing each block of
size λ with m − λ entries set to zero. That is to say, using the notation J (λ,m) introduced in
Equation (4) of Lemma 38, we have PctJ (λ,m) (y
′) = y and y′i = 0 for any i ∈ J (λ,m). Denote
y′′ = SqueezeVec(Bi)i(y
′).
According to the definition of e, the vector y′′ ∈ Fnqm is at distance t of the code RSk(x). Hence,
by decoding, one computes the unique c ∈ RSk(x) at distance 6 t from y′′ and the expansion of
c yields mGpub.
5.3. The XGRS cryptosystem. — We describe here the cryptosystem which we call XGRS,
presented in [KRW19a] by Khathuria, Rosenthal and Weger. Next, we explain why XGRS is a
sub-instance of the SSRS scheme.
5.3.1. Parameters. — The cryptosystem is publicly parametrised by:
– q a prime power;
– m an integer;
– λ such that 2 6 λ < m;
– n, k such that 0 6 k < n 6 qm and km > (m− λ)n.
q m λ n k Public Key Size (kB)
13 3 2 1258 1031 579
7 4 2 1872 1666 844
Table 1. Parameters proposed for the XGRS scheme [KRW19a]
Remark 49. — As suggested by the parameters in Table 1, m is a small integer. The preprint
version of the paper [KRW19b] proposed to use m = 2 with a slightly modified key generation.
The proposed parameters are now m = 3 and m = 4.
5.3.2. Key Generation. —
– Generate uniformly random vectors (x,y) ∈ Fnqm × (F
×
qm)
n such that x has distinct entries.
Denote C =GRSk(x,y) and let Hsec be a parity-check matrix of C .
– Choose γ, a primitive element of Fqm/Fq, i.e. a generator of the field extension. We consider
the basis Bγ = (1, γ, . . . , γm−1) of Fqm .
– Set H
def
= ExpMatB∗γ (Hsec) ∈ F
m(n−k)×mn
q a parity-check matrix ExpCodeBγ (C ).
– For any i ∈ J0, n− 1K, choose Li a random subset of J(i− 1)m, im− 1K of size |Li| = m− λ.
Set L = ∪iLi.
– Set HL
def
= PctL (H) ∈ F
m(n−k)×λn
q .
– For any i ∈ J0, n − 1K, choose Qi a random λ × λ invertible matrix. Denote by Q the
block-diagonal matrix having Q0, . . . ,Qn−1 as diagonal blocks.
– Denote by S the invertible matrix of Fq such that S · HL · Q is in systematic form.
– Set Hpub
def
= S · HL · Q.
– The public key is Hpub, the private key is (x,y,Q,L, γ).
Remark 50. — Compared to the cryptosystem presented in [KRW19a], we omitted the block
permutation. Indeed, applying a block permutation after expanding is equivalent to applying the
permutation before the expansion and then expanding. As we start with a GRS code chosen
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uniformly at random, applying a permutation on the columns does not change the probability
distribution of the public keys.
5.3.3. Encryption. — Recall that t
def
= ⌊n−k2 ⌋ the error–correcting capacity of a GRS code of
length n and dimension k. The message is encoded as a vector y ∈ Fλnq whose support is included
in t blocks of length λ, i.e. there exist positions i0, . . . , it−1 ∈ J0, n− 1K, such that
Support(y) ⊆
⋃
06ℓ6t−1
Jλ(iℓ − 1), λiℓ − 1K.
The ciphertext is then defined as c⊺ = Hpub · y⊺.
5.3.4. Decryption. — In order to decrypt the ciphertext, a user knowing the private key should:
– generate Hsec from x and y.
– compute c′ = c · S−1
⊺
;
– compute c′′ = SqueezeVecBγ (c
′);
– find y′′ ∈ Fnqm of weight |y
′′| 6 t such that c′′⊺ = Hsecy′′
⊺
(i.e.decode in C );
– compute y′ = PctL
(
ExpVecBγ (y
′′)
)
;
– finally recover y = y′ ·
(
Q−1
)⊺
.
5.3.5. Relation with the SSRS scheme. — To conclude this section, we show that the XGRS
scheme is a sub-instance of the SSRS scheme presented in Section 5.1.
Proposition 51. — The XGRS scheme with secret key (x,y,Q,L, γ) is equivalent to the SSRS
scheme with secret key (x,S0, . . . ,Sn−1) where the subspaces Si are defined as follows.
– Let B
(0)
i
def
= PctLi (Bγ) ∈ F
λ
qm where Li
def
= {j −mi, ∀j ∈ L ∩ Jim, (i+ 1)m− 1K}.
– Set B
(1)
i
def
= y−1i B
(0)
i · (Q
−1
i )
⊺
.
– Si is the subspace of Fqm spanned by the elements of B
(1)
i .
Proof. — Let Cpub denote the public code of an instance of the XGRS scheme with private key
(x,y,Q,L, γ), i.e.Cpub is the code over Fq that admits the public keyHpub as parity-check matrix.
We have
Cpub = Dual
(
〈Hpub 〉Fq
)
= Dual
(
〈HL ·Q 〉Fq
)
.
Let us define Q(1)
def
=
(
Q−1
)⊺
. This is still a block-diagonal matrix composed of n blocks of
size λ× λ. We can rewrite this
Cpub = Dual
(
〈HL 〉Fq
)
·Q(1).
We can replace HL by its definition: PctL
(
ExpMatB∗γ
(Hsec)
)
. Next, we can swap the Dual
and Punct operators according to Proposition 9:
Cpub = ShL
(
Dual
(
ExpCodeB∗γ
(
〈Hsec 〉Fq
)))
·Q(1).
We can then swap the Dual and ExpCode operators according to Corollary 44.
Cpub = ShL
(
ExpCodeBγ
(
Dual
(
〈Hsec 〉Fq
)))
·Q(1).
Let Gsec be a generator matrix of the secret code Dual
(
〈Hsec 〉Fq
)
, i.e. a generator matrix of
the code GRSk(x,y). We have
Cpub = ShL
(
ExpCodeBγ
(
〈Gsec 〉Fq
))
·Q(1).
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Let us denoteQ(2) the block-diagonal matrix obtained by replacing each λ×λ matrix ofQ(1) by
the m×m matrix obtained by inserting “an identity row/column” at the positions corresponding
to L. For instance, if m = 3, λ = 2 and the first element of L equals 1, which means that the
column 1 is shortened, we add a column and a row in the middle of Q
(1)
0 , i.e.
if Q
(1)
0 =
(
q00 q01
q10 q11
)
, then Q
(2)
0 =

 q00 0 q010 1 0
q10 0 q11

 .
Hence, we can write
Cpub = ShL
(〈
ExpMatBγ (Gsec) ·Q
(2)
〉
Fq
)
.
We define Q
(3)
i as the matrix obtained from Q
(2)
i by permuting the columns so that the inserted
columns are the m− λ rightmost ones. For instance in the previous example, we would have
Q
(3)
0 =

 q00 q01 00 0 1
q10 q11 0

 .
Therefore, Q(3) = Q(2)P where P is a block–diagonal matrix whose diagonal blocks are m ×m
permutations matrices. Then, we replace L by the set J (λ,m) = {mi+j | 0 6 i < n, λ 6 j < m}.
Hence, we get
Cpub = ShJ (λ,m)
(〈
ExpMatBγ (Gsec) ·Q
(3)
〉
Fq
)
.
We can apply the basis change explained in Lemma 45.
Cpub = ShJ (λ,m)
(〈
ExpMat(B′i)i
(Gsec)
〉
Fq
)
,
where B′i
def
= Bγ ·
(
(Q
(3)
i )
−1
)⊺
for all i ∈ J0, n− 1K. Finally, we apply Corollary 41 and Lemma 47
to replace the code GRSk(x,y) by RSk(x). Hence,
Cpub = ShJ (λ,m)
(〈
ExpMat(Bi)i
(G′sec)
〉
Fq
)
,
where G′sec is a generator matrix of RSk(x) and Bi
def
= y−1i B
′
i for all i ∈ J0, n− 1K. In other words,
Cpub = RSk(x)|(S0,...,Sn−1), where Si is the subspace spanned by the λ first elements of Bi. This
is indeed an instance of the SSRS cryptosystem.
6. The twisted-square code and distinguisher
In this section, we first explore the case m = 3, λ = 2 to give some insight on the interest of
defining the twisted star product of two subspace subcodes. Then, we define this notion for other
parameters. In the second part of the section, we focus on the dimension of the twisted square
codes and how it can be used as a distinguisher.
For the sake of simplicity, all the results of this section are stated using the same subspace and
expansion basis for all blocks but they can be straightforwardly generalised to the case of various
subspaces and expansion bases.
6.1. The twisted square product. —
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6.1.1. Motivation: the case λ = 2,m = 3. — In this section, we consider the case λ = 2,m = 3.
Let us introduce a definition that is needed in the sequel.
Definition 52. — Let S ⊆ Fqm be an Fq–vector space, we define the square subspace
S2
def
= 〈 ab | a, b ∈ S 〉
Fq
.
Lemma 53. — Let S be a subspace of Fqm of dimension 2. Let BS = (γ0, γ1) be a basis of S.
Let a, b ∈ S such that
ExpVecBS ((a)) = (a0, a1) and ExpVecBS ((b)) = (b0, b1).
Then,
ExpVecB
S2
((ab)) = (a0b0, a0b1 + a1b0, a1b1),
where BS2 = (γ
2
0 , γ0γ1, γ
2
1).
Remark 54. — Note that when m = 3 and dimS = 2, we have S2 = Fq3 . Indeed, let (γ0, γ1)
be a basis of S, if γ20 , γ0γ1 and γ
2
1 were not Fq-independent, denoting ζ
def
= γ1/γ0, then 1, ζ and ζ
2
would not be Fq-independent either. Hence ζ would have degree 6 2 over Fq. But by definition
ζ 6∈ Fq.
Consider the SSRS scheme with m = 3, λ = 2. The public key is a generator matrix G of
ExpCode(BS0 ,...,BSn−1)
(
C|(S0,...,Sn−1)
)
. From an attacker’s point of view, the spaces S0, . . . ,Sn−1
and their bases BS0 , . . . ,BSn−1 are unknown. But, we have access to the entries of G, in particular
we have access to the coefficients a0, a1 (resp. b0, b1) of the decomposition in the basis Bi of
the i–th entry of some codewords of C . Hence, the coefficients of the product ab in the basis
(γ20 , γ0γ1, γ
2
1) of S
2
i can be computed without knowing neither C nor the basis Bi. This
motivates the following definition.
Definition 55 (Twisted product). — Let a and b in F2nq whose components are denoted
a = (a
(0)
0 , a
(1)
0 , a
(0)
1 , a
(1)
1 , . . . , a
(0)
n−1, a
(1)
n−1);
b = (b
(0)
0 , b
(1)
0 , b
(0)
1 , b
(1)
1 , . . . , b
(0)
n−1, b
(1)
n−1).
We define the twisted product of a and b as
a ⋆˜ b
def
= (a
(0)
i b
(0)
i , a
(0)
i b
(1)
i + a
(1)
i b
(0)
i , a
(1)
i b
(1)
i )06i6n−1 ∈ F
3n
q .
This definition extends to the product of codes, where the twisted product of two codes A and
B ⊆ F2nq is defined as
A ⋆˜B
def
= 〈a ⋆˜ b | a ∈ A , b ∈ B 〉
Fq
.
In particular, A ⋆˜2 denotes the twisted square code of a code A : A ⋆˜2
def
= A ⋆˜A .
With this definition, we can rewrite Lemma 53 for vectors in the following way.
Lemma 56. — Let S be a subspace of Fqm of dimension 2. Let BS = (γ0, γ1) be a basis of S.
Let a, b ∈ Fnqm such that all their entries lie in S. Then,
(5) ExpVecBS (a) ⋆˜ExpVecBS (b) = ExpVecBS2 (a ⋆ b),
where BS2 = (γ
2
0 , γ0γ1, γ
2
1).
Extending this result to codes, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 57. — Let BS be an Fq–basis of S such that BS = (γ0, γ1). Let
Cpub = ExpCodeBS (C|S),
where C is an [n, k] code over Fqm . Then,
(6) C ⋆˜2pub ⊆ ExpCodeB
S2
(
C
⋆2
)
,
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where BS2 = (γ
2
0 , γ0γ1, γ
2
1). This results generalises straightforwardly to an expansion over various
subspaces.
Proof. — This is a consequence of Lemma 56.
Remark 58. — In the sequel, we see that under a reasonable conjecture and some condition,
the inclusion in (6) is an equality. See Conjecture 67.
6.1.2. General definition of the twisted square code. —
Remark 59. — This section is a generalisation of the previous definitions and results. A reader
only interested in the practical aspects of the attack can skip directly to Section 7.
For arbitrary λ > 2, we have the following definition.
Definition 60 (Twisted square product, general case). — Let a and b in Fλnq whose
components are denoted
a = (a0,0, . . . , a0,λ−1, a1,0, . . . , a1,λ−1, . . . , an−1,0, . . . , an−1,λ−1),
b = (b0,0, . . . , b0,λ−1, b1,0, . . . , b1,λ−1, . . . , bn−1,0, . . . , bn−1,λ−1).
We define the twisted product a ⋆˜ b ∈ F
(λ+12 )n
q of a and b such that for any i ∈ J0, n− 1K and for
r, s such that 0 6 r 6 s 6 λ− 1,
(a ⋆˜ b)i(λ+12 )+(
s+1
2 )+r
def
=
{
ai,rbi,s + ai,sbi,r if r < s
ai,rbi,r if r = s.
This definition extends to the product of codes, where the twisted product of two codes A and
B ⊆ Fλnq is defined as
A ⋆˜B
def
= 〈a ⋆˜ b | a ∈ A , b ∈ B 〉
Fq
.
In particular, A ⋆˜2 denotes the twisted square code of a code A : A ⋆˜2
def
= A ⋆˜A .
We are interested in the case where S2 = Fqm , because the goal is to reconstruct a fully expanded
code. For a random subspace S ⊆ Fqm of dimension λ, its dimension is typically min
{(
λ+1
2
)
,m
}
.
The case m = 3, λ = 2 is a special case where
(
λ+1
2
)
= m. Hence, for other parameters m,λ such
that
(
λ+1
2
)
= m, Theorem 57 generalises straightforwardly. But when
(
λ+1
2
)
> m, the twisted
square code does not correspond to an expanded code. It is as if the code were expanded over a
generating family of Fqm which is not a basis: the vectors are too long. A way to circumvent this
and to obtain a result similar to Theorem 57 is to shorten the twisted square code to cancel the
useless columns and obtain an expansion over a basis. This yields the following results.
Lemma 61. — Let S be a subspace of Fqm of dimension λ such that S2 = Fqm . Let BS =
(γ0, . . . , γλ−1) be a basis of S. Let BS2 denote the first m elements of (γ
2
0 , γ0γ1, . . . , γ0γi, γ1γi, . . . ,
γ2i , . . . , γ
2
λ−1). Let a, b ∈ F
n
qm whose entries all lie in S. Denote c the vector of length
(
λ+1
2
)
n over
Fq defined as
c
def
= ExpVecBS (a) ⋆˜ExpVecBS (b).
Let J0 denote the set J
(
m,
(
λ+1
2
))
, i.e.
(7) J0
def
=
{(
λ+1
2
)
i+ j, i ∈ J0, n− 1K, j ∈ Jm,
(
λ+1
2
)
− 1K
}
.
If
(i) BS2 is a basis of Fqm ;
(ii) for any i ∈ J0, the i-th entry of c is zero,
then,
(8) PctJ0 (c) = ExpVecB
S2
(a ⋆ b).
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Proof. — Let c be defined as in the statement. We want to prove that
SqueezeVecB
S2
(PctJ0 (c)) = a ⋆ b.
This is equivalent to Equation (8) because BS2 is a basis of Fqm . Without loss of generality, we
only need to focus on the block corresponding to the first entry in Fqm .
Let (a0, . . . , aλ−1) and (b0, . . . , bλ−1) denote the decomposition of the first entries of a (resp.
b) over BS . The first entry of a ⋆ b is(∑
i
aiγi
)∑
j
ajγj

 = ∑
06i6j<λ
ci,jγiγj ,
where the coefficients ci,j match exactly the definition of the twisted square product, hence corre-
spond to the entries of c.
Let Bfull denote the family (γ20 , γ0γ1, . . . , γ0γi, γ1γi, . . . , γ
2
i , . . . , γ
2
λ−1). The last entries of each
block of c are equal to zero. This corresponds exactly to the elements of Bfull that are not in BS2 .
We therefore have
SqueezeVecB
S2
(PctJ0 (c)) = SqueezeVecBfull(c) = a ⋆ b.
This leads to the following main statement.
Theorem 62. — Let S ⊆ Fqm be a subspace of dimension λ such that S
2 = Fqm . Let BS be an
Fq–basis of S such that BS = (γ0, . . . , γλ−1). Let
Cpub = ExpCodeBS (C|S),
where C is an [n, k] code over Fqm . Then,
(9) ShJ0
(
C
⋆˜2
pub
)
⊆ ExpCodeB
S2
(
C
⋆2
)
,
where BS2 and J0 are defined as in Lemma 61. This result generalises straightforwardly to an
expansion over various subspaces and bases.
Proof. — Compared to Lemma 61 and its proof, one should be careful that ShJ0
(
C ⋆˜2pub
)
is in
general not spanned by words of the form PctJ0 (a⋆˜b) with a, b ∈ ExpCodeB(Cpub) but by words
of the form
PctJ0 (a0⋆˜b0 + · · ·+ as⋆˜bs) , for a0, . . . ,as, b0, . . . , bs ∈ Cpub.
Therefore, one needs to apply the very same reasoning as that of the proof of Lemma 61 replacing
a⋆˜b by a sum of such vectors. The proof generalises straightforwardly, since all the involved
operators are linear.
Remark 63. — In the sequel, we see that under a reasonable conjecture and some condition,
the inclusion in (9) is an equality. See Conjecture 67.
6.2. Dimension of the twisted square of subspace subcodes. —
6.2.1. Typical dimension of the twisted square of a random subspace subcode. —
Lemma 64. — Let C ⊆ Fnqm and S ⊆ Fqm be an Fq–subspace. Then
(10) dimFq (C|S)
⋆2
Fq
6 min
{
mn, m · dimFqm C
⋆2
}
.
Proof. — Let C ⊆ Fnqm and S ⊆ Fqm be an Fq–vector space such that S
2 = Fqm . Then
(11) (C|S)
⋆2
Fq
⊆ C ⋆2.
Indeed, it suffices to observe that the result holds on Fq–generators. Let a, b ∈ C|S . Then,
a⋆b ∈ C ⋆2. In addition, for any i ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}, we have (a⋆b)i ∈ S2. Thus, a⋆b ∈ (C ⋆2)|S2 .
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Similarly to the case of the square code (Theorem 4), we expect that (10) and equivalently (11)
is typically an equality. Our experiments using the computer algebra software Sage encourages us
to establish the following conjecture.
Conjecture 65. — For any positive integer k such that 2k 6 n, any Fq–subspace S ⊆ Fnqm of
dimension λ > 2 such that S2 = Fqm and any Fq–basis BS of S, let R denote an [n, k] code chosen
uniformly at random, then
P
[
dimFq
(
ExpCodeBS (R|S)
)⋆˜2
= min
{(
λ+ 1
2
)
n,
(
km− n(m− λ) + 1
2
)}]
−→
k→∞
1.
Here it is worth noting that in general
(
λ+1
2
)
> m. Therefore, as already noticed before stating
Lemma 61, the twisted square product may represent something which is not an expansion with
respect to a basis but a kind of expansion with respect to generators of the Si’s. A solution to get
an expansion again is to proceed as in the statement of Theorem 62 and to shorten this twisted
square code at the set J0 introduced in (7). That is to say, shortening the code at the
(
λ+1
2
)
−m
last positions of each block of length
(
λ+1
2
)
. By this manner and according to Conjecture 65, for
a random code R, we typically have
dimFq ShJ0
(
ExpCodeBS (R|S)
⋆˜2
)
=
min
{
mn,
(
km− n(m− λ) + 1
2
)
− n
((
λ+ 1
2
)
−m
)}
.
6.2.2. Typical dimension of the twisted square of a subspace subcode of a RS code. — On the other
hand, subspace subcodes of Reed–Solomon codes have a different behaviour. Indeed, Theorem 62
yields the following result.
Corollary 66. — Given a GRS code C = GRSk(x,y) with 2k 6 n, and an Fq–subspace S ⊆ Fqm
of dimension λ < m such that S2 = Fqm . Then,
(12) dimFq
(
ShJ0
(
ExpCodeBS (C|S)
)⋆˜2)
6 min{mn,m(2k − 1)}.
Conjecture 67. — The inequality in Corollary 66 is typically an equality as soon as(
dimFq C|S + 1
2
)
> min{mn,m(2k − 1)}.
6.2.3. The distinguisher. — The twisted product provides us a distinguisher between expanded
subspace subcodes of GRS codes and expanded subspace subcodes of random codes. Indeed,
assuming Conjecture 65, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 68. — Let k be a positive integer such that 2k < n and D = ExpCodeBS (C|S), where
C is either a random [n, k] code over Fqm or an [n, k] GRS code over Fqm . Suppose also that
m(2k − 1) < min
{
mn,
(
km− n(m− λ) + 1
2
)
− n
((
λ+ 1
2
)
−m
)}
.
Then, assuming Conjectures 65 and 67 the computation of dimFq ShJ0
(
D ⋆˜2
)
provides a
polynomial-time algorithm which decides whether C is an RS code or a random code and
succeeds with high probability. This extends straightforwardly to the case of multiple spaces and
bases.
Remark 69. — The condition 2k < n is necessary for the distinguisher. Indeed, if 2k > n, the
square code of the GRS code spans the whole space Fnqm . Hence it can not be distinguished from
a random code. When this condition is not met, it is sometimes possible to shorten the code so
that the shortened code meets this condition. This is addressed in Section 6.2.5.
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6.2.4. Experimental results. — Using the computer algebra software Sage, we tested the be-
haviour of the dimension of the twisted square (shortened at J0) of subspace subcodes either of
random codes or of RS codes. For each parameter set (see Table 2), we ran more than 100 test
and none of them yielded dimensions of the twisted square that was different from the typical
value given either by Conjecture 65 or by Corollary 66 together with Conjecture 67.
Code q m λ n k
Expected Actual
Dimension Dimension
of ShJ0
(
C ⋆˜2
)
of ShJ0
(
C ⋆˜2
)
Random 7 3 2 120 55 360 360
RS 7 3 2 120 55 327 327
Random 7 5 3 160 75 800 800
RS 7 5 3 160 75 745 745
Table 2. Parameter sets for the tests. The code C is the shortening at m−λ positions
per block of the expansion of a parent code. The parent code is either random or a
Reed–Solomon code. Its status is precised in the left–hand column. The column before
the last one gives the expected dimension of the twisted square code shortened at J0
according to Conjecture 65 for the random case and to Corollary 66 and Conjecture 67
for the RS case. The last column gives the actual dimension computed using Sage of
the twisted square code. For each set of parameters, at least 100 tests were run and the
actual dimension never differed from the expected one.
Remark 70. — Here again, we discussed the case of a single subspace S with a unique basis B
for the sake of simplicity, but the distinguisher straightforwardly extends to the case of multiple
spaces of dimension λ whose squares fill in Fqm together with multiple bases.
6.2.5. Broadening the range of the distinguisher by shortening. — Similarly to the works
[CGG+14, COT17], the range of the distinguisher can be broadened by shortening the public
code. This can make the distinguisher work in some cases when 2k > n. The idea is to shorten
some blocks of length λ (corresponding to a given position of the original code in Fnqm). For each
shortened block the degree k is decreased by 1. Indeed, from Lemma 42 shortening a whole block
corresponds to shortening the corresponding position of the parent code over Fqm .
Let us investigate the condition for this to work. Let s0 be the least positive integer such that
2(k − s0)− 1 < n− s0, i.e.
s0
def
= 2k − n.
If one shortens the public code at s > s0 blocks, which corresponds to s(m− λ) positions, we can
apply Theorem 68 on the shortened code. The condition of the theorem becomes
(13)
m(2(k−s)−1) < min
{
m(n− s),
(
m(k − s)− (n− s)(m− λ) + 1
2
)
− (n− s)
((
λ+ 1
2
)
−m
)}
.
Example 71. — Consider the parameters of XGRS in the first row of Table 1. Suppose we
shorten s = 820 blocks of the public key (i.e. 1260 positions of the parent GRS code). It corre-
sponds to reduce to n′ = n− s = 438 and k′ = k − s = 211. The shortened public key will have
dimension 195.
Thus, the twisted square of the shortened public key will have typical dimension 1263 while
the twisted square of an expanded subspace subcode of a random code would have full length,
i.e. 3(n− s) = 1314.
6.2.6. Limits of the distinguisher: the “m/2 barrier”. — Suppose that λ 6 m2 and let C be a
GRS code of dimension k and S a subspace of dimension λ such that the SSRS code reaches the
typical dimension (see Propositions 17 and 19), i.e.dimFq C|S = km− n(m− λ).
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In order for this dimension to be positive, we must have
k > n
(
1−
λ
m
)
>
n
2
·
This is incompatible with the necessary condition 2k < n (see Remark 69) and can not be
overcome by shortening blocks as described in Section 6.2.5. Hence, whenever λ 6 m/2, the
distinguisher is ineffective.
Remark 72. — In [COT14b, COT17] a distinguisher on so–called wild Goppa codes over
quadratic extensions is established using the square code operation after a suitable shortening.
This corresponds precisely to the case λ = 1 andm = 2 which, according to the previous discussion,
should be out of reach of the distinguisher. The reason why this distinguisher is efficient for these
parameters is precisely because the dimension of such codes significantly exceeds the lower bound
of Proposition 17 (see [SKHN76, COT14a]).
7. Attacking the SSRS scheme
In this section, we describe how to use these tools to attack the SSRS scheme. For the sake
of convenience, we first focus on the parameters with m = 3, λ = 2 and then discuss the general
case.
7.1. The case m = 3 and λ = 2. —
7.1.1. Constructing the square code. — Let Cpub be the public code of an instance of the SSRS
scheme. This code is described by a generator matrix Gpub which is the only data we have access
to. We know that there exist unknown spaces S0, . . . ,Sn−1 with bases BSi = (bi,0, bi,1) and an RS
code over Fqm such that
Cpub = ExpCode(BSi)i
(
RSk(x)|(Si)i
)
.
We can compute the generator matrix of the twisted square code C ⋆˜2pub, which according to Theo-
rem 57 and Conjecture 67 is equal with high probability to
ExpCode(
B
S2
i
)
i
(RS2k−1(x)) ,
where BS2i
def
= (b2i,0, bi,0bi,1, b
2
i,1). It is important to stress that, at this stage, we do not know the
value of x nor the BSi or the BS2i .
7.1.2. Finding the value of x. — We now have access to a fully expanded RS code (and not a
subspace subcode) and want to use this to find the value of x. In fact, the authors of [BGK19]
propose an algorithm to solve this problem, by using a generalisation of the algorithm of Sidelnikov
and Shestakov [SS92] to recover the structure of GRS codes.
Theorem 73. — [BGK19, § IV.B] Let x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ Fnqm be a vector with distinct
entries and B0, . . . ,Bn−1 be an n–tuple of Fq–bases of Fqm . Let
C = ExpCode(Bi)i(RSk(x)).
There exists a polynomial time algorithm which
takes as inputs C , three distinct elements x′0, x
′
1, x
′
2 ∈ Fqm and an Fq–basis B
′
0 of Fqm ;
and returns x′3, . . . , x
′
n−1 ∈ F
n
qm and Fq–bases (B
′
1, . . . ,B
′
n−1) of Fqm such that
C = ExpCode(B′0,...,B′n−1)(RSk((x
′
0, . . . , x
′
n−1))).
The principle of the algorithm is very similar to that of Sidelnikov Shestakov. Starting from
a systematic generator matrix of an expanded Reed–Solomon code, the hidden structure of the
RS code is deduced from relations satisfied by the m × m blocks of the right hand side of this
systematic generator matrix.
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Remark 74. — Theorem 73 asserts in particular that the choice of three values of the support
together with one basis uniquely determines a pair (x, (Bi)i) describing a code ExpCode(Bi)i(x).
Using this Theorem 73, we obtain a vector x′ and Fq–bases B′i of Fq3 such that
C
⋆˜2
pub = ExpCode(B′i)i
(RS2k−1(x
′)).
Remark 75. — Note that the value of x′ is not necessarily the same as the one contained in the
secret key but we are looking for an equivalent secret key, i.e. we only need a code description
which allows us to decode.
7.1.3. Recovering a secret key. — Once x′ is found, there remains to find bases BS′
0
, . . . ,BS′n−1
of 2–dimensional subspaces S ′0, . . . ,S
′
n−1 ⊆ Fq3 such that
Cpub = ExpCode(B
S′
i
)
i
(RSk(x
′)).
These bases can be obtained by solving a linear system. They are the pairs
BS′
0
= (b
(0)
0 , b
(1)
0 ), . . . ,BS′n−1 = (b
(0)
n−1, b
(1)
n−1)
such that
SqueezeCode(
B
S′
i
)
i
(Cpub) ⊆ RSk(x
′),
which can be equated as follows. Let H be a parity–check matrix of RSk(x) and Gpub a generator
matrix of Cpub. Let
B =


b
(0)
0 (0)
b
(1)
0
b
(0)
1
b
(1)
1
. . .
b
(0)
n−1
(0) b
(1)
n−1


∈ F2n×nq3 .
The unknown entries of B are the solutions of the linear system
(14) GpubBH
⊺ = 0.
There are
– 2n unknowns in Fq3 which yields 6n unknowns in Fq;
– for (3k − n)(n− k) = O(n2) equations.
Thus, the matrix B is very likely to be the unique solution up to a scalar multiple. From this, we
obtain a complete equivalent secret key, which allows to decrypt any ciphertext.
Remark 76. — After presenting a polynomial time recovery of the structure of expanded GRS
codes in [BGK19, § IV.B], the extension to expanded SSRS codes is discussed [BGK19, § VI.C].
The suggested approach consists in performing a brute–force search on the expansion bases
B0, . . . ,Bn−1. But the cost of such an approach is exponential in n and λ. Our use of the
twisted square code permits to address the same problem in polynomial time.
7.1.4. Extending the reach of the attack by shortening blocks. — As explained in Section 6.2.5, it
may happen that C ⋆˜2pub = F
3n
q , i.e. the twisted square of the public code equals the whole ambient
space. In such a situation, the distinguisher fails and so does the attack. To overcome this issue, it
is sometimes possible to shorten a fixed number s of blocks of Cpub and apply the previous attack
to this block–shortened code.
More precisely, let I ⊆ J0, 2n − 1K be a set of indices corresponding to a union of blocks,
i.e. of the form I = {2i0, 2i0 + 1, . . . , 2is, 2is + 1}. We apply the previous algorithm to the code
ShI (Cpub) which returns ((x
′
i)i/∈I , (B
′
i)i6∈I) such that
ShI (Cpub)
⋆˜2
= ExpCode(B′i)i/∈I ((x
′
i)i/∈I).
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Recall that the choice of three of the x′i’s and one of the Bi’s entirely determines the other ones.
Then, one can re-apply the same process with another set of blocks I1 such that there are at least
3 that are neither in I0 nor in I1. This allows to deduce new values for xi’s for i ∈ I \ I1. And
we repeat this operation until x′ is entirely computed. Then, we proceed as in Section 7.1.3 to
recover the rest of the secret key.
7.1.5. Application: attacking some parameters of the XGRS system. — The proposed attack per-
mits to break efficiently any parameters of Type I proposed in [KRW19b] (i.e.with λ = 2 and
m = 3). Using a Sage implementation, the calculation of C ⋆˜2pub takes a few minutes. Next, we ob-
tained a full key recovery using the “guess and squeeze” approach described further in Section 7.5
followed by a usual Sidelnikov Shestakov attack. The overall attack runs in less than one hour for
keys corresponding to a claimed security level of 256 bits. The previously described approach con-
sisting in applying directly the algorithm of [BGK19, § VI.B] on C ⋆˜2pub has not been implemented
but is probably even more efficient.
7.2. The general case. — The example of attack presented in Section 7.1 extends to any case
where the distinguisher presented in Section 6.2.3 succeeds. The attack generalises straightfor-
wardly up to the following details.
– According to Theorem 62, the algorithm of [BGK19, § VI.B] should no longer be applied
directly on C ⋆˜2pub but on ShJ0
(
C ⋆˜2pub
)
, where J0 is defined in Lemma 61 (7).
– The recovery of the subspaces and bases described in Section 7.1.3 involves a matrix B ∈
F
λn×n
q with λn nonzero entries, which will be the unknowns of the system (14). Hence, this
system has λn unknowns in Fqm , i.e.λmn unknowns in Fq for (mk−n(m−λ))(n−k) = O(n2)
equations. As the value of m (and hence λ) remain very small compared to n, there is still
in general a unique solution up to a scalar multiple.
7.3. Summary of the attack. — The attack can be summarised by the following algorithms,
depending on the values of k and n.
Algorithm 1 The attack when 2k − 1 < n
1: Compute ShJ0
(
C ⋆˜2pub
)
, where J0 is the the union of the last
(
λ+1
2
)
−m positions of each block
(see Lemma 38 (4));
2: Apply the algorithm of [BGK19, § VI.B] to recover a support x of the parent Reed–Solomon
code;
3: Apply the calculations of Section 7.1.3 to recover the bases Bi.
Algorithm 2 Attack when 2k − 1 > n
1: Choose a number s of blocks to shorten satisfying condition (13) so that the distinguisher
succeeds.
2: Pick a union of s blocks I and
(a) Compute ShJ ′0
(
ShI (Cpub)
⋆˜2
)
, where J ′0 is the union of the last
(
λ+1
2
)
−m positions
of each block;
(b) Apply the algorithm of [BGK19, § VI.B] to recover a partial support (xi)i/∈I ;
(c) Repeat this process with another I until you got the whole support x.
3: Apply the calculations of Section 7.1.3 to recover the bases Bi.
Remark 77. — In the case λ = 2 and m = 3,
(
λ+1
2
)
= 3 = m and hence J0 = ∅.
7.4. Complexity. — For the complexity analysis and according to the parameters proposed in
[KRW19b], we suppose that m = O(1), λ = O(1) and k = Θ(n).
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7.4.1. Step 1, the twisted square computation. — First let us evaluate the cost of the computation
of the twisted square of the code Cpub ⊆ Fλnq of dimension k0
def
= (mk − n(m− λ))).
1. Starting from a k0 × λn generator matrix of Cpub, any non ordered pair of rows provides
a generator of the twisted square. Hence there are
(
k0+1
2
)
= O(n2) generators to compute,
each computation costing n
(
λ+1
2
)
operations. This is an overall cost of O(n3) operations in
Fq.
2. Then, deducing a row echelon generator matrix of this twisted square from these O(n2)
generators has the cost of the computation of the row echelon form of a O(n2) × O(n)
matrix, which requires O(nω+1) operations in Fq (see [BCG
+17, Théorème 8.6]), where
ω 6 3 is the complexity exponent of operations of linear algebra.
Thus, the overall cost of the computation of this twisted square code is O(nω+1). In addition,
in the situation where 2k − 1 > n, we need to iterate the calculation on a constant number of
shortenings of the public code, which has no influence on the complexity exponent.
Remark 78. — Similarly to the discussions [COT17, § VI.D] and [CMCP17, § VI.B.4], it
is possible to randomly generate O(n) generators of the twisted square code and perform the
echelon form on this subset of generators. This provides the whole twisted square code with a
high probability, reducing the cost of the calculation to O(nω) operations in Fq.
7.4.2. Step 2, recovering x. — The second step of the attack, i.e.performing the algorithm of
[BGK19, § VI.B] to recover x is not that expensive. A quick analysis of this algorithm permits
to observe that the most time consuming step is the calculation of the systematic form of the
generator matrix, which has actually been performed in the previous step. Therefore, this second
step can be neglected in the complexity analysis.
7.4.3. Step 3, recovering the bases. — Finally, the last step of the attack, consisting in recovering
the bases Bi, consists in a resolution of a linear system of O(n2) equations and O(n) unknowns,
which costs O(nω+1) operations.
Summary. The overall cost of the attack is of O(nω+1) operations in Fq.
7.5. Recovering the bases for arbitrary expanded codes: guess and squeeze. — To
conclude this section, we present an alternative approach to detect the hidden structure of ex-
panded codes and recover the expansion bases. This method applies to the expansion of any code.
It can in particular apply to the twisted square of SSRS codes. As explained in Section 7.1.5, this
is the approach we implemented. The interest of this approach is that it may apply to expansions
of codes which are not RS codes and hence may be an interesting tool for other cryptanalyses.
Given a code C ⊆ Fnqm and bases B0, . . . ,Bn−1 of Fqm , suppose you only know a generator
matrix of
Cexp
def
= ExpCode(Bi)(C ).
The objective is to guess the Bi’s iteratively instead of brute forcing any n–tuple of bases, which
would be prohibitive.
Step 1. Shorten Cexp at k − 1 blocks (which corresponds to m(k − 1) positions). This yields a
code whose dimension most of the times equals m. According to Lemma 42, this is the
expansion of a code of dimension 1 obtained by shortening C at k − 1 positions.
Step 2. Puncture this shortened code in order to keep only two blocks. We get a [2m,m] code
which we call Cexp,tiny ⊆ F2mq . This code is the expansion of a [2, 1] code called Ctiny ⊆
F
2
qm obtained from C by shortening k − 1 positions and puncturing the remaining code
in order to keep only 2 positions.
Step 3. Now, for any pair of bases (B0,B1) of Fqm , compute
SqueezeCode(B0,B1)(Cexp,tiny).
The point is that, for a wrong choice of bases, we get a generator matrix withm rows and
2 columns which is very likely to be full rank. Hence a wrong choice provides the trivial
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code F2qm . On the other hand, a good choice of bases provides the code Ctiny which has
dimension 1. This property permits to guess the bases.
Actually, according to Lemma 47, if one guesses the bases a0B0, a1B1 for some a0, a1 ∈ F
×
qm ,
the squeezing will provide Ctiny ⋆ (a0, a1) which also has dimension 1. Therefore, it is possible to
first guess the bases up to a scalar multiple in F×qm . Therefore, the cost of computing these two
bases is in O(q2m(m−1)) operations.
Once the first two bases are known, one can restart the process by with another pair of blocks
involving one of the two blocks for which the basis is already known, which requires O(qm(m−1))
operations. This yields an overall complexity of O(q2m(m−1)+nqm(m−1)) operations in Fq for this
guess and squeeze algorithm.
Remark 79. — Note that in the attack of XGRS scheme, the bases to guess are known to
be of the form (1, γ, γ2, . . . , γm−1) for some generator γ ∈ Fqm . This additional information
permits to significantly improve this search and reduce the cost of the calculation of the n bases
to O(q2m + nqm) operations.
Remark 80. — Proceeding this way, only permits to get back the code C ⋆ a ⊆ Fnqm for an
unknown vector a ∈ (F×qm)
n
. However, this is an important first step. For instance, if C was a
Reed–Solomon, we obtain a generalised Reed–Solomon code whose structure is computable using
Sidelnikov and Shestakov attack. It is then possible to decode.
8. Conclusion
We presented a polynomial time distinguisher on subspace subcodes of Reed–Solomon codes
relying on a new operation called the twisted square product. We are hence able to distinguish
SSRS codes from random ones as soon as the dimension λ of the subspaces exceeds m2 . From this
distinguisher, we derived an attack breaking in particular the parameter set λ = 2 and m = 3 of
the XGRS system [KRW19a].
These results clarify the overview on McEliece encryption scheme based on algebraic codes. On
the one hand, we have generalised Reed–Solomon codes, which are known to be insecure since
the early 90’s. On the other hand, alternant codes seem to resist to any attack except some
Goppa codes with an extension degree m = 2 [COT17, FPdP14]. The present work provides
an analysis of a family of codes including these two cases as the two extremities of a spectrum.
Concerning the subspace subcodes lying in between, we show an inherent weakness of SSRS codes
when λ > m/2 (See Figure 1, page 3). The case λ = m/2 is in general out of reach of our
distinguisher, but remains border line as testified by some attacks on the cases λ = 1,m = 2 in
the literature [COT17, FPdP14].
A question which remains open is the actual security of the cases 1 < λ < m/2 which are out of
reach of the twisted square code distinguisher. These codes, which include alternant codes, deserve
to have a careful security analysis in the near future. Indeed, if they turn out to be resistant to
any attack, they could provide an alternative to Classic McEliece [BCL+19] with shorter key
sizes. On the other hand, if some of these codes turned out to be insecure, this may impact the
security of Classic McEliece which is a crucial question in the near future.
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